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The New ROMANTICS
Parties, movements, coalitions — the left’s realignment 
continues. A n d the catchcry is out for a new politics. But 
Jeffrey Minson argues that the new trends in the left 
can't succeed without a grip on political realism as w ell as
a new vision.
I t is a good bet that, within a year, at least one new radical p o litica l organ isa tion  will 
formally get off the ground in 
Australia.
If current tendencies in the 
Rainbow Alliance, the New Left 
Party Charter group, or even within 
the Communist Party of Australia 
are anything to go by, it (or they) will 
differ markedly from the traditional 
left parties, with a much stronger 
base in the social movements. It will 
no t  have  m uch to  do  w ith  
insurrectionist marxist traditions of 
political analysts, rhetoric and party 
organisations, especially leninist, 
stalinist or trotskyist ones.
N e v e r th e l e s s ,  r e s e r v a t io n s  
about the tag aside, one of  its leading 
edges will be unmistakeably socialist. 
A majority in all the  above groups 
agree on the need for an extensive 
program of economic "socialisation” 
as a major precondition for social 
and environmental changes. Deep 
ecologists no less than trotskyists 
need not apply.
So advances have been made 
during this spate of  new (non- 
i n s u r r e c t i o n i s t )  p a r t y - f o r m i n g  
activity. If the trust and common 
ground built up so far can be 
sustained; if efforts to build norms of 
political conduct originating in the 
s o c i a l  m o v e m e n t s  i n t o  new  
o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e s  a re  
successful; and if the interest in 
p o l i c y - f o r m a t i o n  is f u r t h e r  
developed, then the prospects for 
such a political organisation are, in 
many respects, quite bright. It should 
attract a  far bigger membership than 
existing left parties. The old left's 
destructive centrifugal tendences 
might be checked. The Australian
Democrats might have a serious 
rival.
Yet there is still reason to  doubt 
whether a social-movement-based 
party by itself could have more than 
nuisance value in the contemporary 
Australian political scene. These 
reasons will be stated shortly. But 
rather than justify this reservation at 
length, my main concern is to 
examine what I take to be a 
watershed in Australian progressive 
politics one which, were we to 
learn from it, might prove that 
reservation unfounded.
This watershed is signalled by 
the publication this year of John  
Mathews’ pamphlet A Culture o f  
Power'. Its interest lies first in its 
attempt to make the current ACTU 
strategy for industrial reconstruction 
the cornerstone of a broader social- 
democratic reformation. Second, in 
its attempt to marry Accord-style 
recipes for industrial democracy to a 
broader form of political democracy 
based on institutional recognition of 
pluralism. Third, in its attempt to 
wean leftists away from a purely 
oppositionalist ethos (a “culture of 
protest”). A framework is developed 
according to  which policy is both 
informed by progressive principles 
and long-term goals while also being 
“grounded in the responsible exercise 
of power". A “culture of power” is 
envisaged that would be, one might 
say. pragmatic on principle.
But is this seeming reconcil­
iation of  opposites an organisational 
possibility or merely a philosophical 
one? The virtues and limitations of 
this kind of perspective can best be 
appreciated in the first instance by 
examining two characteristics of 
current left orthodoxy: an endemic
utopianism and a related incapacity 
to be serious about pluralism.
The Culture of Protest
All political parties need values. 
Any progressive one needs a 
"vision”: some set o f  principled, 
long-term objectives. If party- 
political practice is seen as the art of 
the possible, then commitments to 
currently unattainable goals are 
bound to look utopian in the simple 
sense of be ing  idealis tic .  So 
utopianism is not a problem as such. 
The problems arise over the place of 
values in a progressive party’s 
program, the choice of values, and 
the sort of utopianism to which it is 
committed. The brunt of my 
criticism is directed against the 
Romantic utopian stripe in left 
literature, conferences and meetings. 
Romantic philosophy treats politics 
not as the art o f  the possible, but as a 
vehicle. for creative social or self- 
perfection. It is the elevation of 
magic to the status of a political art 
form.
P o l i t i c a l  R o m a n t i c i s m  is 
apparent in a powerful tendency to 
view the social movements as the 
locus o f  all political virtue. The 
problem here is not the attempt to 
build on the social movements as 
such, but rather the tendency to 
identify them with their most radical, 
“com m unitarian” protest dimen­
sions. Or, more precisely, with 
elements of  those dimensions which 
seem most in keeping with Romantic 
ideals of creative self-activity and 
communal wholeness, such as 
“brainstorming" rituals. As if ther 
were not less Romantic ways of 
fostering the confidence, capacities
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a n d  i n t e r e s t  r e q u i r e d  f o r  
participating actively in meetings 
and conferences, such as the standing 
orders and chairing procedures 
evolved in the women’s movement or 
aspects o f thecom m unis ttrad ition  of 
cadre education.
R o m a n t i c i s i n g  th e  so c ia l  
movements veils their failures and 
successes alike. Has the w omen’s 
movement, for instance, always 
e v a d e d  t h e  s n a r e s  o f  s e l f ­
marginalisation associated with the 
“ o l d ” left: p re a c h in g  to  the 
c o n v e r t e d ,  s e c t a r i a n i s m ,  a n d  
allowing itself to  be identified with a 
restricted “lifestyle’7  The power-base 
and appeal of feminism has not been 
uniformly so restricted. Countless 
women — and men — who are 
unidentified with feminism as a 
political movement have incorp­
o r a t e d  f e m i n i s t  n o r m s  a n d  
e x p e c ta t io n s  in to  th e i r  Ivies. 
Countless improvements in women’s 
circumstances have depended on 
feminists’ historical willingness to 
involve themselves, in an “official” 
capacity, in legal, trade union, 
business, health, media and other 
institutions.
Utopianism is also manifest in 
the privileged place of values in 
determining the longer-term vision 
of left political organisation. New 
Economic Directions fo r  Australia, 
a recent discussion paper circulated 
by the Rainbow Alliance, perfectly 
e x e m p l i f i e s  t h e  w i d e s p r e a d  
conviction that the First step for a 
new left party is to draw up a vision 
of an alternative society — a "non- 
capitalist, democratic, just and 
e n v i r o n m e n t a l l y  s u s t a i n a b l e  
economy” — solely on the basis of a 
combination of labour and social 
movement ideals. Here Romanticism 
is not the only problem; nor is the 
paper’s encouraging commitment to 
d e ta i led  policy  c o n s ru c t io n  a 
sufficient counterweight.
Reading through the program's 
“guesstimates” on the number of full­
time jobs per annum to be created 
(p.20) or  the cost o f  its Guaranteed 
Adequate Income Scheme {pp.23-4) 
it is hard not to  be reminded of 
Engels' observation in the Anti- 
Duhring on the classical utopian 
socialists' programs: “The more
completely they were worked out in 
detail, the more they could not avoid 
drifting into pure fantasies”. David 
Burchell’s report on New Economic 
Directions { ALR  106) attributes 
what he. too, sees as its “eerie 
otherworldliness” to its failure to 
frame its vision with a political 
strategy. One factor contributing to 
this failure can be traced to an 
implication of this standard new left 
practice of elaborating its political 
vision on a solely ethical basis.
In the spirit of the “utopian 
socialists” Owen. Fourier and Saint- 
Simon, the need for a radical new 
order is based on an  unqualified 
r e j e c t i o n  o f  c o n t e m p o r a r y  
institutions: “existing planning and 
administrative structures are either 
positively hostile ... or lack the 
in te l le c tu a l  an d  o r g a n i s a t io n a l  
resources” to realise such an order (p. 
46). The counterpart to  making 
ethics the sole foundation and
R om anticising the social 
movements veils their failures 
and successes alike
measure of  a new order is the abscnce 
of any reference to established yet 
(potentially) progressive institutions 
which might serve as springboards 
from which a left alternative might 
t a k e  o ff .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  th e  
“ realistic” division o f  the proposed 
program into “short” and “medium 
term ” ingredients means little. How 
are even the “short-term” proposals 
in the blueprint supposed to get off 
the drawing board'?
T o  this perennial question the 
non-insurrectionist left has a set 
answer: the election of  a left 
government backcd by an extra- 
parliamentary alliance of “popular” 
forces, with the capacity to legislate 
a n d  i m p l e m e n t  th e  d e s i r e d  
programmatic changes. Support for 
this position is almost inseparable 
from an uneasiness about powerful 
institutions and organised interests 
w h ich  a re  n o t  a m e n a b l e  to  
democratic or legislative pressures. 
But what if this scenario and, 
c o n s e q u e n t l y .  Ne w E co n o m ic  
Directions, were open to a quite 
different objection?
T h e  c o n u n d r u m  a b o u t  
implementing a socialist “vision" 
arose from its utopian derivation 
from a purely ethical foundation. 
Apart from the institutional vacuum 
in which this places the program it 
a lso  m a k e s  it in c a p a b le  of 
a c k n o w l e d i n g  th e  p lu ra lis tic  
structure of  modern liberal states. 
N o t  a l l  t h e  i n n u m e r a b l e ,  
overlapping, conflicting variety of 
public/private divisions character­
istic of such societies are reducible to 
capitalist economic organisation. 
M any  o f  the  in d iv id u a l  and 
associational freedoms associated 
with these divisions are highly 
desirable. Others simply have to be 
lived with. Among these can be 
i n c l u d e d  i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e  
differences in values and life-styles. 
This diversity is reflected in the 
multiplicity of reasons for which 
individuals support a given political 
party. In turn, this means that no 
elected party can assume to itself a 
mandate to implement its entire 
program. Electoral majorities are 
cobbled together on a patchwork 
basis  q u i te  in c o m p a t ib le  with 
p r o g r a m m a t i c  a m b i t i o n s  to 
transform society from top to 
bottom on the basis of a unitary 
ethos,
l aking pluralism seriously also 
m e a n s  a b a n d o n i n g  th e  le f t ’s 
favourite contrast between co­
operation and competition as general 
principles of social organisation, A 
pluralistic socialist state may require 
not only political competition but 
also certain (regulated) forms of 
economic competition. Broadening 
its value-base might enable the left to 
canvass support am ong a broader 
constituency than the small band of 
left labour and social movement 
activists to whom this document is 
principally addressed.
None of these criticisms detracts 
from the interest of manj of New 
Economic Directions’ individual 
policy proposals themselves. But can 
this utopian style of  political 
program (hardly unique to the 
Rainbow Alliance) be abandoned 
and pluralism embraced without 
capitulating to  powermongering 
pragmatism? It is partly on the
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supposition that these {idealist, 
pragmatist) alternatives are not in 
fact exhaustive that A Culture o f  
Power is staked.
Associative democracy
Mathews describes his proposal as 
“a new paradigm of dem ocratis­
ation’'. By '“paradigm" Mathews 
means “a framework for conceptual 
and practical w ork” which is 
“sufficiently open-ended to  leave all 
sorts of p ro b lem s ... for practitioners 
to resolve" yet which "should provide 
us with a means of choosing between 
different strategic and tactical 
options for reaching quite different 
strategic goals” i.e. as capable of 
g e n e ra t in g  a c o h e re n t  policy- 
package. Policy should be based not 
only — as in New Economic 
Directions — on ideals but also on a 
strategic understanding of the 
constraints and opportunities of “the 
current situation". This both requires 
and limits the “open-endcdness” of 
the framework, which insists on a 
(strategically justified) leading role 
for labour movement organisations. 
Yet determining the content of 
■’Labour Movement Goals in the 
Eighties’’ (as the pamphlet is sub­
titled) cannot be the prerogative of 
the labour movement alone; whence 
the pluralistic orientation of his 
paradigm towards “the activities of 
autonom ous associations of workers 
and citizens”.
For Mathews, the primary 
political fact is the existence of a 
third-term l .abor government which, 
having proven itself capable of 
“ responsible” economic manage­
ment, is in a position to initiate a 
p o l i t i c a l l y  a c c e p ta b l e  re fo rm  
program. The second ingredient of 
th e  c u r r e n t  s i t u a t i o n  is the  
persistence, indeed the exacerbation 
under the Hawke government, of a 
d e t e r i o r a t i o n  in A u s t r a l i a ' s  
m a n u f a c t u r i n g  p e r f o r m a n c e  
(reflected in its balance of payments 
deficit). The third factor is the 
coninuing presence of the New Right 
and its free-market and anti-union 
s o l u t i o n s  to  every  e c o n o m ic  
problem.
Mathews concedes that, to an 
extent, some New Right views have 
become internalised within the ALP
itself. So why should it countenance 
economic and social democratisat­
ion? Here the Accord enters the 
picture; on any account a major 
contributor to the A L P ’s success as 
an “economic manager”. However 
many labour movement hopes it may 
have disappointed, the Accord both 
locks the government into meeting 
some “social wage” demands and 
makes available a series of formal 
and informal footholds for trade 
union (consultative) participation in 
macro-economic decision-making 
beyond the issues of living standards.
The Accord provides the labour 
movement with the institutional 
leverage with which to constitute 
itself as this country’s "leading force 
for social transformation". The 
A C T U 's  f o r m a l  a d o p t i o n  o f  
Australia Reconstructed at its 1987 
Congress marks a significant shift on 
the union movement’s part away 
from being a traditional locus of  
defensive protest.
Within the “culture of power” 
into which, according to Mathews, 
the labour movement is settling , 
d e m o c r a t i s a t i o n  o f  e c o n o m ic  
organisation has to be justified both 
on principle and on the grounds of its 
offering meaningful and practical 
solutions to  currently intractable 
p r o b le m s ,  n o t a b l y  A u s t r a l i a ' s  
declining international competitive­
ness and industrial investment levels. 
The paradigm of democratisation is 
thus required to serve two masters. It
must make sense in mainstream (big 
business) economic terms. But it 
must also persuade left labour and 
social movement activists formed 
within a culture o f  protest that 
enough o f their aspirations can be 
met by participating in a culture of 
power.
For this broad mobilisation of 
support to occur a long-term vision is 
required. This vision must also make 
sense in mainstream political and 
ethical terms. Above all, disaffection 
w i th  c e n t r a l i s e d  g o v e r n m e n t  
administration coming from the left, 
right and centre o f  the political 
spectrum must be addressed. Only 
through the intervention of policies 
which don't require bureaucratic 
overseeing, high personal taxation 
and the sorts of centralised planning 
which are inimical to local initiatives, 
can the ethical-political ground be 
cut away from the New Right 
critique of  all government economic 
interventions. M athews’ paradigm is 
accordingly geared to a “socialis­
a t ion” of industry which is not 
predicated on its becoming a state 
monopoly.
Accordingly, three main targets 
are singled out for democratisation: 
w o r k  o r g a n i s a t i o n ,  c a p i t a l  
investment, and social security 
provision for unemployment.
How does the proposal on 
democratising work incorporate 
traditional labour movement goals 
in to  p o l i t i c a l  “ b u s i n e s s - l i k e ” 
solutions to current economic 
problems? A hallmark of leading 
manufacturing sectors in many of the 
recently most successful national 
economies has been the displacement 
of an  a u th o r i t a r i a n  " F o r d i s t ” 
management style by strategies of 
“flexible specialisation”. As Ewer, 
Higgins and Stephens have argued in 
their Trade Unions and the Future o f  
Australian Manufacturing, part of 
the key to competitive advantage in 
manufacturing lies not in state-of- 
the-art technology as such but in the 
quality o! its “applied technique". 
W hat m akes  the  c o m p e t i t iv e  
difference is an accumulation of 
refinements required to integrate the 
technology into a given production 
process. The “good business" side of 
the case tor industrial democratis-
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ation tests on the premium which the 
successful application of advanced 
technology places on fostering the 
skills, initiative and commitment of 
the workforce and the consequent 
need for a democratic reorganisation 
o f  work.
The democratisation of capital 
extends this argument. It would not 
require “ bigger” government or high 
taxes; and would seek to go beyond 
influencing corporate behaviour 
from without by democratising the 
levels of internal corporate power. A 
wide range of policy instruments are 
c a n v a s s e d :  f r o m  c h a n g e s  to  
company law affecting director 
accountability, employee or trade 
union controlled investment funds, 
and worker directors to planning 
^ r e e m e n t s  e m b r a c i n g  " g o o d  
corporate  citizen” guidelines on 
environmental, race and gender 
issues.
N o matter how it is achieved, 
industrial restructuring will entail a 
net loss of  jobs  and of the expectation 
of full-time life-long employment for 
the whole adult population. The 
main thrust of Mathews’ “social 
policy” recommendations is to make 
welfare no longer a marginal cost 
incurred for “non-economic"reasons 
such as equity, which can be 
represented as only a “ luxury” 
financed from resources “otherwise" 
available for economic development 
or private consumption. Instead, it is 
to become integral to national 
e c o n o m ic  d e v e lo p m e n t .  F ro m  
workers ' point of view redundancy in 
the interest of economic "progress” is 
less u n a c c e p ta b le  if they  -a re  
financially cushioned from the 
effects of restructuring, retrained for 
new work and not stigmatised lor not 
being in paid employment. It is in this 
new economic restructuring context 
that Mathews puts forward his 
version of a Guaranteed Minimum 
Income Scheme. The “democratic” 
dimension of this social policy 
presumably lies in its use o f  welfare 
to foster rather than to curtail 
workers' statuses and capacities as 
“ industrial citizens”.
At this juncture the proposals 
for industrial democratisation and 
related social policies are placed 
within the broader context o f  an
“associative democracy”. This is 
derived from Paul Hirst's revival o f  
t h e  e a r l y  t w e n t i e t h  c e n t u r y  
associational socialist tradition. 
Originally, for example in G .D.H. 
Cole’s Guild Socialism Restated 
(1920), associationalism aimed at the 
displacement of  “the state” by a 
society of producer's associations. 
On the assumption o f  an underlying 
identity of (working class) interests, 
these associations could be left to 
manage themselves spontaneously. 
In Hirst's version, the basic idea of a 
p l u r a l i t y  o f  so c ia l ly  o w n e d ,  
democratically managed bodies with 
their own aims and ways of doing 
things is extended from factories to 
non-industrial associations.
Graham Richardson's famous 
conversion to the environ­
mental cause on the road to 
Kakadu
M o r e o v e r ,  a s s o c i a t i o n a l  
d e m o c r a c y  r e q u i r e s  s t a t e  
interventions, e.g. public agencies to 
supervise associations backed by a 
constitutional “legal order". The 
a s s o c ia t io n a l is t  socia l is t  s ta te ,  
however, “ builds on tather than 
negates — the plurality and diversity 
of western civil society, it enhances 
the powers of voluntary associations 
and communities". Presumably, this 
entails styles of state regulation and 
“action at a distance’ which work 
neither by “ rolling back the state" 
n o r  by excessive  “ n a n n y in g ” . 
Pluralism requires the state to “build 
associations into its own order 
t h r o u g h  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  a n d  
c o n s u l t a t i v e  m e c h a n i s m s "  to  
decentralise authority within (he 
limits set by the need for a legal 
monopoly of force.
How does Mathews build this 
pluralistic view of socialist political 
o b jec tives  in to  his p a ra d ig m ?  
Unfortunately the pamphlet mostly 
provides only the patchiest of 
i n d i c a t i o n s .  F i r s t l y ,  u n l i k e  
traditional left programs. Mathews 
is not committed to identifying the 
labour and social movements. The 
po l i t ic a l  logic o f  "a s so c ia t iv e  
democracy” requires both respecting
the autonom y of workers' and 
citizens’ associations and regulating 
them. Alliances between the various 
movements must accordingly be 
“constructed" with respect to limited 
issues and occasions, such as 
environmental policy on the timber 
industry or electoral pacts. Trade 
unions would, of course, be one such 
regu la ted  “ a s s o c ia t io n "  among 
others. The terms of the current 
Accord, Mathews suggests, could be 
widened to bring in social movement 
interests.
Secondly, associative democ­
racy permits a principled but flexible 
a t t i t u d e  to  th e  q u e s t i o n  of 
privatisation, on which a more 
developed case is made against 
blanket opposition and in favour of 
certain sorts of privatisation which 
d o n ’t entail deregulation and which 
foster worker initiatives.
T h i r d l y ,  th e  a s s o c i a t i v e  
paradigm requires political plarties 
to accept pluralism to the point of 
giving up “the illusion of rule”. For 
reasons already discussed, party 
manifestos must rather be seen as 
ambit claims on the basis of which a 
government committed to pluralism 
plays a brokerage, orchestrating role, 
bargaining for co-operation in 
implementing its policies on the part 
o f  diverse or even opposing interests.
The ghost in the paradigm
Together with its advocacy of a 
culture of power, Mathews’proposal 
for a progressive development of an 
Accord politics provides a measure 
of the distance the left has to travel in 
order to arrive at a vision of an 
achievable future. Mathews’attempt 
to construct a new basis for an ALP. 
labour and social movement alliance 
bv appropriating the associational 
model of  democracy represents one 
of the few attempts on the Australian 
left to come to grips with the realities 
of pluralism.
However, it cannot be said that 
the innovative components of 
M a th e w s ' " v i s io n ” arc always 
consistently sustained or developed 
Many o f the problems coalesce in the 
shades o f  the "old left" which hover 
o \e r  his attempt to broaden out the 
accord with a view to constructing
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“an exceedingly broad coalition that 
will com m and support from a 
m a jo r i t y  o f  th e  p o p u l a t i o n ,  
c o n d e m n i n g  t h e  r i g h t  t o  
marginality".
T h e  vehic le  im ag in ed  by 
Mathews for the hoped-for political 
settlement between the labour and 
social movements consists of a 
renegotiated Accord between the 
Labor Party, the ACTU and the 
social movements. Even if these 
social movements possessed integral 
organisational structures, the fact 
remains that such an expansion of 
parties to the Accord would place an 
impossible burden on it. How would 
the parties to it be determined? And 
what would be the consequences for 
the labour movement's capacity to 
present a united front to employers in 
the relevant areas of industry policy, 
price-monitoring, superannuation, 
to say nothing o f wage negotiations 
and so on, if these organisations are 
confronted not with the ACTU alone 
but a host of diverse bodies and 
interests'?
The proposal for an expanded 
Accord is absurd for other reasons 
too. Jo h n  Mathews is no different 
from many other left-thinking 
people in tacitly identifying the social 
movements entirety with “the culture 
of protest". Environmentalists, for 
example, are said to be better at 
drawing attention to  symptoms than 
to causes and cures and therefore 
need l abor toshow  them the way. As 
if environmentalism, no less than 
feminism — as pointed out earlier — 
did not already have a well-organised 
foot in the governmental door. As if 
G r a h a m  R i c h a r d s o n ’s f a m o u s  
conversion to the cause on the road 
to Kakadu did not mark A LP 
recognition of the environment as a 
significant electoral issue. The 
“m ansion” of government has many 
rooms, not to say states, ministries, 
commissions and tribunals. Why, 
then, privilege federal economic 
policy as the social movements’ sole 
pointof entry? The answer possibly 
lies in unreconstructed elements of 
Mathews* Labor-left inheritance.
The proposal to lock the social 
m o v e m e n t s  a n d  th e  l a b o u r  
movement into an ail-cmbracing 
electoral and policy alliance with the
A LP via an economic Accord is all 
too reminiscent o f  the “old left” 
fantasy of subsuming the social 
movements under an allegedly more 
fundamental socialist program. It is 
assumed that socialism is both 
consistent with all their values and 
objectives and provides all the 
m a te r ia l  c o n d i t io n s  fo r  the ir  
realisation.
Claims that a socialist political 
p r o g r a m  can  a d d r e s s  so c ia l  
movement demands might be more 
syninpathetically received by the 
latter were they accompanied by 
recognition of the limitations of an 
Accord politics and its dependence 
on social movement support. The 
more ambitious policy aims of 
A ustra lia  R econstruc ted  reveal 
several such points of dependency for 
their realisation on a more diffuse 
cultural mobilisation of support and 
practical involvement. National 
economic regeneration depends on 
generating “a production culture and 
consciousness”
This accent on the need to 
generate a productionist culture is 
not empty rhetoric. Flexibility in the 
face of  technical restructuring, 
commitment to localised improve­
ments, quality control, prompt 
delivery and workers' capacity to 
engage in an informed way in 
industrial codetermination processes 
will remain a chimera, argues the 
document, if retraining is limited to 
t e c h n ic a l  o n - t h e - j o b  m a t t e r s .  
Whence, for instance, the demand 
for paid leave for some employees for 
the purpose not only of  retraining 
but o f  a more general social and civil 
education as wel+ as general literacy 
and numeracy training, special
courses for migrants and other 
disadvantaged groups.
Here is a clear point of entry for 
th e  w o m e n 's  m o v e m e n t ,  f o r  
example, to  argue (as Pat Ranald 
and Caroline King ai'gued in A L R  
105) that more union attention is 
required to the particular locations 
and skill-structure of  w om en’s 
employment, e.g. to the non- 
vocational components of retraining.
The fact that the latter lies 
predominantly in the service sector in 
turn draws attention to the limits of 
seeking the galvanisation of popular 
commitment to a production culture. 
While there is a strong strategic case 
for placing industrial restructuring 
(and its social policy concomitants) 
at the forefront of socialist renewal, 
there is a further possibility which 
chimes in with recent leftist attention 
to issues of popular, culture and 
"lifestyle”, namely the socialisation 
not of  production as such but of 
economic consumption and its 
culture. While this cannot be pursued 
here, it points to yet another instance 
o f  the dependence of labour 
movement “strategic unionism” on 
other forces.
No doubt Mathews’ pamphlet 
will p ro v o k e  n u m e ro u s  o th e r  
objections. For example, to its 
under-estimation of both the depth 
o f  cynicism about the Accord among 
trade unionists, and the grip of 
political Romanticism on the left. 
One objection which, however, 
merely increases its relevance for a 
new left party is the incongruity of 
p ro p o s in g  a d is t in c t ly  leftish  
program to a Labor party which is 
and always will be itself a coalition of 
left and right opinion. But then, part 
o f  the value of  Mathews’ pamphlet is 
precisely its provocativeness, and 
nowhere more so than in the 
corrosive implications for political 
romanticism of its biting the bullet of 
pluralism. A pluralist socialism must 
be pragmatic on principle.
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